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Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics. By William J. 
Prior. London & Sydney, Croom Helm, 1986. pp201. Reviewed 
by J . Angelo Corlett, University of California — Santa Barbara. 
Prior argues against two opposing approaches to Plato's 
metaphysics. "Radical revisionism," he holds, goes to the 
extreme of arguing that the Platonic corpus involves radical 
changes in Plato's metaphysics, while "unitarianism" argues 
that Plato's metaphysics remain essentially the same 
throughout the corpus. Prior offers an alternative to these 
positions, a view which I shall call "moderate 
developmentalism". In his argument for the development of 
Plato's metaphysics from the Timeaus to the Sophist Prior 
claims that "there is considerable continuity in Plato's 
thought, and at the same time considerable development" (p. 
165). Hence Prior argues for a mediating position between both 
radical revisionism and unitarianism. 
To support his position Prior derives evidence for moderate 
developmentalism by way of the following analysis. He 
commences with evidence from the earlier and middle 
dialogues which show a fundamental unity in Plato's thought. 
Many traditional problems are discussed, including the self-
predication and self-participation of forms and the Being-
Becoming distinction. Prior concludes that "Plato does not 
accept self-predication as a general principle," though he does 
accept the fact that some form (such as the form of Beauty in 
the Symposium) are self-predicative (p. 29). Indeed, Prior's 
discussion of Plato's metaphysics in the earlier and middle 
dialogues is not one which treats the theory of forms in itself. 
Instead, it is one which discusses the merit of specific 
philosophical problems of paramount importance to Plato. 
Prior takes the stylometric evidence for the dating of the 
Parmenides as a middle dialogue to be persuasive. In so doing, 
he considers the dialogue as a challenge to some key aspects of 
Plato's thought in the dialogues dated earlier than the 
Parmenides. Prior takes the challenge of the Parmenides as 
evidence for development in Plato's thought: 
The arguments of the Parmenides, though they do not refute the 
Theory of Forms, do expose certain problems, ambiguities and 
Ausli'gung, Vol. XIV, No. 1. 
110 AUSLEGUNG 
weaknesses in it. In so doing, they present a programme of sorts 
for the development of that theory in the late dialogues (p. 84). 
The remainder of Prior's book, however, consists of a 
discussion of the Timeaus and the Sophist. He argues that the 
Timeaus is Plato's response to the metaphysical problem posed 
regarding the theory of forms in the Parmenides. The former 
dialogue. Prior thinks, vindicates the earlier and middle 
dialogues against the problems of self-predication posed by the 
latter dialogue. It is largely because of this that Prior argues 
against the revisionists in dating the Timeaus later than the 
Parmenides. 
In the Sophist Prior sees Plato putting to new use the theory 
of forms used in earlier dialogues. Thus, Prior dates the 
Sophist after the Timeaus. He further argues that 
the Sophist contains no evidence of the abandonment of the view 
that the Forms are paradigms; rather, it contains evidence that 
the metaphysical scheme of original and image is still part of 
Plato's thought, (p. 128). 
Prior sees this as evidence for unity in Plato's thought. 
Even if one grants Prior that his textual analysis supports 
his moderate developmentalist claim, there are fundamental 
problems with Prior's notion of moderate developmentalism 
itself. Precisely to what does Prior's claim of moderate 
developmentalism amount? What is the sense of his claim? 
The first reason Prior's claim is problematic is because it is 
not altogether clear what he means by the expressions "unity" 
and "development." That is, his use of these expressions is 
ambiguous. Certainly by "unity" he does not mean that Plato's 
beliefs form a coherent metaphysic when considered from the 
vantage point of the entire Platonic corpus (p. 163-4). He seems 
to mean that there are certain fundamental ideas which 
characterize Plato's beliefs throughout many of the dialogues 
(p. 164). 
But what does Prior mean by the "development" of Plato's 
metaphysics? Perhaps he means that whatever contradicts, 
significantly disagrees with or significantly modifies the 
fundamentals of Plato's beliefs constitutes a development in 
Plato's thought (p. 163). It this is what Prior means by 
"development," then any belief found in the corpus which 
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contradicts (or is not reconcilable with) what is believed to be a 
fundamental doctrine of Plato's is simply a development of 
Plato's metaphysics. But this is objectionable because it 
assumes part of what Prior's moderate developmentalism is 
trying to prove, i.e., that there is indeed unity concerning 
Plato's beliefs which goes to make up Plato's metaphysics. If 
this is not what Prior means by the development of Plato's 
metaphysics, then perhaps he means that it is a breakthrough 
in Plato's thought which represents an extension of his concepts 
rather than an abandonment of them (p. 140). But if Prior 
means by the development of Plato's metaphysics that Plato's 
views differ only in substance from one dialogue to another (or 
within a dialogue) on occasion, then Prior is (by implication) 
attributing to Plato a philosophical attitude in which Plato 
never actually abandons one of his views or concepts. Is one to 
think that one of the greatest figures in philosophy is also a 
most sterile and immutable thinker? 
Not only are there ambiguities concerning the key terms of 
Prior's claim, his claim is problematic when taken as 
conjunction. It might be taken in one of a number of ways. There 
is a weak sense in which it might be taken to mean that some 
unity and development exists in the corpus. This is a very safe 
claim, amounting to the assertion that unity and development 
of Plato's thought does exist in the corpus: 
(A) Some unity and some development exists between the 
substantive concepts contained in the Platonic corpus. 
To support (A) all Prior needs to do is to provide at least one 
instance of a Platonic unity-concept and one instance of a 
Platonic development-concept. (By "unity-concept" I mean a 
concept which Prior would consider to support the claim that 
there is unity in Plato's thought. By "development-concept" I 
mean a concept which Prior would consider to support the claim 
that there is development in Plato's thought.) Perhaps no 
contemporary philosopher disputes Prior's ability to do this. 
In fact, one might question Prior's reason for making such a 
claim in light of the fact that the majority of philosophers 
hold some form of moderate developmentalism regarding 
Plato's metaphysics. Certainly Prior is not making a novel 
claim. If this is the sense of Prior's claim, then it is 
philosophically uninteresting. This is not to say, of course. 
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that Prior's support of this claim is philosophically 
uninteresting. 
But Prior's claim might be taken in a stronger sense 
according to which only unity and development exists in the 
corpus. If the expressions "unity" and "development" are used 
in such a manner that their respective senses are contradictory 
(i.e., nothing that counts as the unity of Plato's thought can at 
the same time count as the development of it), then Prior's 
argument is reducible to an exclusive disjunction. That is, if a 
concept in the corpus is interpreted as being either a unity-
concept or a development-concept, then such a concept cannot be 
both a unity-concept and a development-concept at the same 
time. Otherwise the concept is self-contradictory. 
Furthermore, assuming that there are no concepts in the corpus 
except those of unity-concepts and development-concepts, 
either a concept belongs to the former category or it belongs to 
the latter category. (Note that nothing in Prior's statement of 
moderate developmentalism precludes unity-concepts and 
development-concepts from being both mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive.) Now Prior's claim becomes an exclusive 
disjunction: 
(B) Each substantive concept in the Platonic corpus is either a 
unity-concept or a development-concept, not both. 
However, the difficulty with (B) is that it is tautological 
since: 1) Every concept in the Platonic corpus is either a unity-
concept of the development-concept and not both; and 2) The 
respective senses of "unity" and "development" are 
contradictory. (B) is tautological because it is a claim which is 
true by virtue of its logical form: 
(pv-p)&-(p&-p) 
where "p" is a unity-concept and where "-p" amounts to a 
development-concept.' (B) is tautological in that no matter 
what truth value ("the truth" or "the false") is substituted for 
"p," the schema has "the true" as its truth value. 
There is another difficulty with (B). There seems to be no 
manner by which to provide a disproof of it. It is unfalsifiable. 
By this I do not mean that no possible mass of textual evidence 
can be brought to bear against Prior's claim, but that no single 
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piece of textual evidence can count against the moderate 
developmentalist position in that such evidence can always be 
used (in one way or another) to support moderate 
developmentalism. No matter which concept within the 
Platonic corpus is considered that concept is either a unity-
concept or a development-concept. For example, if the meaning 
and use of eithos differs significantly from either one dialogue 
to another or from one passage to another within a dialogue, 
then such evidence can be used to support that aspect of Prior's 
claim which is developmental. On the other hand, if passages 
containing eithos possess a significant degree of continuity 
either within a dialogue or between dialogues, then this can be 
used to support that aspect of Prior's moderate 
developmentalism which emphasizes the unity of Plato's 
metaphysics. In either case. Prior's claim is supported since 
(according to this way of construing Prior's claim) there are no 
other concepts possible than those of unity or development. 
It appears that the only manner by which to falsify (B) is 
to show that one of the following is the case: 1) That none of 
Plato's beliefs develop or contradict one another in any fashion 
throughout the corpus (unitarianism), 2) That all of Plato's 
beliefs change radically from dialogue to dialogue, from 
context to context (radical revisionism). But even this 
approach to falsifying this construal of Prior's claim is 
problematic, since no matter how many ideas one brings forth in 
favor (and only in favor) of either unitarianism or radical 
revisionism there is still the possibility that one has not 
considered every one of Plato's substantive concepts within the 
corpus. This being logically possible, one can never be certain 
that there does not remain another such concept in the corpus 
which would contradict either unitarianism or radical 
revisionism. Therefore, the only means by which to falsify (B) 
are methodologically impossible, making this construal of 
Prior's claim unfalsifiable. 
The point of this criticism is to introduce Prior's Puzzle. It 
is a puzzle for the moderate developmentalist. If Prior's 
moderate developmentalist claim is taken in the weak sense 
(A), then it is philosophically uninteresting. Most all who 
study the Platonic corpus believe there is unity and 
development of thought within the corpus. If his claim is 
taken in the stronger sense (B), then it is tautological and 
unfalsifiable. It is true by virtue of its logical form, and every 
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substantive concept found in the Platonic corpus supports his 
claim necessarily. Taken in either case. Prior's claim is 
problematic. 
In Prior's statement of moderate developmentalism, 
ambiguities regarding "unity" and "development" lead to 
multiple interpretations of the claim which are 
philosophically uninteresting, tautological and unfalsifiable. 
How can moderate developmentalism (a view which most 
philosophers think is intuitively correct) be stated to avoid 
these difficulties? 
If Prior's moderate developmentalism is to have any sense 
as a philosophical claim about beliefs which might be 
attributable to Plato, then this claim must be restated in a 
manner which evades the ambiguities and difficulties 
discussed above. I am aware of no way by which this puzzle 
might be resolved. If it cannot be resolved, and assuming that 
Prior's Puzzle is a puzzle and is properly formulated, then it 
seems that his moderate developmentalist claim is 
problematic in the ways I outline above. 
Prior provides some information and penetrating analysis 
regarding, for instance, the third man argument (pp. 64-74). 
Moreover, many of his arguments are plausible. However, Prior 
is not careful to clarify the claim which such evidence is 
supposed to support: moderate developmentalism. This 
carelessness takes something away from the overall quality of 
his project. 
Reality at Risk by Roger Trigg. New York: Barnes and Nobel, 
1980. Pp. xx + 216. Reviewed by Leslie Jones, University of 
Kansas. 
In his earlier book Reason and Commitment (Cambridge, 
1973) Roger Trigg concludes that 
What in fact has been missing from so much recent controversy 
in religion, science and other fields is the notion of objective 
reality-of things being the case whether people recognize them 
or not. 
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The purpose of the present work is to provide further arguments 
supporting this conclusion. Unfortunately, Trigg fails to 
provide a lucid definition of 'objective reality'. Trigg calls 
himself a 'genuine realist', but he is never very clear about 
what kind of realist this is. There are, of course, many 
independent forms of realism. Being a realist about entitles 
such as electrons and quarks does not entail that one is a realist 
about other entities such as cultures, characters, and coffee cups. 
Nor does it entail that one is realist about theories. Simply 
put, being a realist does not place strictures on what one takes to 
be "real." Among the various positions of realism there is one 
which Hilary Putnam has called "metaphysical realism." Its 
main differentiating characteristic is that it supposes that the 
world, i.e, reality, is not dependent in any way upon the actions 
and cognitive capacities of man. It is this position which has 
been brought into question not only by interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, but by arguments of philosophers as well. 
Trigg seems to argue from a position something like 
metaphysical realism. Nonetheless, Trigg is not concerned 
with any particular realism, he simply wishes to show that 
the question of what reality is like is independent of the 
question of how we can conceive of it. 
The discussion of Realism in Reality at Risk runs the 
gauntlet of analytic philosophy. He begins by discussing and 
arguing against the various not-realist-enough positions in the 
philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, 
epistemology, and the philosophy of science. He is a 
"thorough-going" realist faced with a philosophical 
community leaning towards various forms of non-realism 
which, he argues, are close to idealism. In response, Trigg is 
quick to point out that "reality is far stranger than our 
developing conceptions of it may at one time suggest." He uses 
the changing descriptions of it in the history of science and 
philosophy as evidence. Whereas this portrayal of human 
limitation leaves open the possibility that these limits may, 
in the future, be extended, such a humble description of human 
intelligence does not jibe very well with a realism impervious 
to the vicissitudes of human inquiry. For how then did we 
acquire the knowledge that reality is possibly so different from 
what we are capable of knowing? Further, how is this 
important knowledge of an "independent" reality to be 
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distinguished from a mere socio-historical quirk? This central 
question is not particularly new to realism of any camp, and 
quite a number of plausible answers have been attempted. None 
of these answers, however, allows metaphysical realism to 
remain unscathed. Putnam's "internal realism" attempts to 
deal a heavy blow to any form of realism which claims to be 
fully theory independent, while at the same time maintaining 
the existence of a persistent world. Ian Hacking's near-
Baconian realism claims a theory independent world but 
maintains that our conception of reality is dependent on 
evidence received from experimentation, and thus what counts 
as reality is theory-dependent. 
Admittedly, these and many other arguments for realism, 
i.e., the metatheories of reality, seem to lack the kind of 
precision that is required for a palatable account of reality. In 
this respect Arthur Fine, in "The Natural Ontological 
Attitude" (Scientific Realism, ed. J . Leplin) remarks, 
Metatheoretic arguments must satisfy more stringent 
requirements than those placed on the arguments used by the 
theory in question, for otherwise the significance of reasoning 
about a theory is simply moot. (p. 85) 
It is such requirements that Reality At Risk also fails to 
provide. In fact Trigg displays some mercurial justifications for 
holding a realist view, particularly in his discussion of the 
relation between 'genuine' realism and Science, in its study of 
reality. At a few points he states that science "provides a test 
case for realism." Yet, in chapter 6, "Reality and Quantum 
Mechanics," he avers that no scientific discoveries can either 
refute realism or do damage to the realist position. 
Vacillations of this sort are, of course, more than a symptom of 
the problematic position of metaphysical realism. They are 
the very fabric out of which it is made. Realists of Trigg's 
genre fail to provide satisfactory answers to questions 
concerning the relations between language and the world. 
For the most part Trigg's discussion of Reality presents 
negative answers to the question of what reality is like. He 
does tell us that observation and experience are avenues into 
reality, but he does not specify how they provide this access. 
In fact, he generally refrains from giving any answer to the 
tough questions which metaphysical realism faces, though he 
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docs ask these questions when raising objections to other 
accounts of realism. 
Consequently, the conclusion of Reality at Risk is less 
forceful than one would expect from a defence of metaphysical 
realism: man is only a part of objective reality. He does not 
decide what is true, rather he pursues truth, i.e., the correct 
account of reality. Trigg tells us that this is the goal of science 
and philosophy and "the repudiation of [this] goal would not 
only destroy science, but would make human intellectual 
activity totally pointless." So, it seems that even though Trigg 
passes over pragmatic considerations when initially discussing 
reality he ends with a defence of metaphysical realism which 
is essentially pragmatic; that is, we must assume an 
independent reality if we are to make sense of the way we 
make sense of science and human intellectual inquiry. But I can 
not help wondering why one would call this 'genuine' realism. 
